In so holding, the Court recited the relative merits of its standard, which was announced previously in Adams v. Texas 8 and rejected the language regarding juror exclusion contained in the Witherspoon footnote. 9 In particular, the Witt Court recognized the strength of the state's interest in obtaining jurors who would apply the law and follow their oaths.' 0 The Witt Court further ruled that a trial judge's finding of juror bias was a "factual issue" subject to a "presumption of correctness" by a federal reviewing court." This Note will analyze the Witt decision and the previous development of the sixth amendment safeguards provided for capital defendants. It will discuss the Supreme Court's past rulings on the issue of proper juror exclusion in light of the precepts of Witherspoon and in light of the Court's recognition of the delicate balance between a capital defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury and the state's interest in obtaining jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and obey their oaths. This Note will conclude that although in Wainwright v. Witt the Supreme Court established a coherent standard by which the state may exclude jurors opposed to capital punishment, it ignored and abandoned the fundamental safeguards that Witherspoon provided for a capital defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1974, a Florida jury tried and convicted Johnny Paul Witt of first degree murder. 12 The jury recommended that Witt be sentenced to death, and the trial judge complied, imposing the death The court of appeals limited its consideration of the Witherspoon issue to the following voir dire exchange which led to venireman and two days after that confessed to participation with Tillman in the murder. Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497, 499 (Fla. 1977) , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977) . 13 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 847. Upon a defendant's conviction of a capital felony, Florida law provides for a separate sentencing procedure, in which the state and the defendant may present arguments to the jury for or against the sentence of death. After hearing the arguments, the jury deliberates and renders an advisory sentence to the court as to whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141. (West 1977) .
14 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 847. Witt raised claims that his conviction was erroneous because of (1) improper exclusion of prospective jurors, (2) improper admission of his confession, and (3) an assertion that the state rule on competency was outdated. He also argued that imposition of the death penalty was improper under the facts of the case. Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d at 498-99.
15 Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d at 498-99. The trial court excluded six prospective jurors who stated that they could not return a sentence of death even upon weighing all of the factors of the crime, or stated that they could not impartially judge the guilt or innocence of the accused without the possible imposition of the death penalty interfering with their findings. Witt's appeal challenged the exclusion of three of these prospective jurors. any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
6
The court of appeals held that Colby's statements fell "far short of the certainty required by Witherspoon to justify for cause excusal."
Furthermore, the court of appeals expressed uncertainty as to the degree of deference owed to a trial court's finding of juror bias. 28 The court, however, found this immaterial to the case's resolution, since it was convinced that the trial court erred in excusing venireman Colby for cause "under even the least rigorous standard of appellate review." '29 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve the confusion surrounding both the application of Witherspoon in the lower courts and the standard that federal courts should apply when reviewing procedures for juror selection in capital trials.
30

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WITHERSPOON PROTECTIONS
Prior to 1968, it was common for the state to exclude from capital juries anyone who opposed the death penalty in any manner.
3 '
In Witherspoon, however, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an Illinois statute which provided for the cause excusal of any juror who stated that he had "conscientious scruples" against capi- 7 (1984) . The Witherspoon trial was a common example of the judicial tone of the voir dire. Prior to the questioning of the veniremen, the judge remarked: "Let's get these conscientious objectors out of the way, without wasting any time on them." Forty-seven veniremen were quickly excluded because of their attitudes toward the death penalty. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 514.
32 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512. 33 The Court declined, however, to reverse the conviction on the basis that ajury so selected was conviction-prone. The Court judged that the data on the subject was too fragmentary to make a ruling on the issue. Id. at 517. Since the Court's decision, many studies have considered the "prosecution-proneness" of "death-qualified" jurors. See, e.g., White, Death Qualified Juries: The "Prosecution Proneness" Argument Re-examined, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 353 (1980) .
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penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction" could not constitutionally sentence a man to death.
The Court in Witherspoon was clearly aware of the limitations of its holding. At the outset, the Court acknowledged that the issue before it was a narrow one:
It does not involve the right of the prosecution to challenge for cause those prospective jurors who state that their reservations about capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. Nor does it involve the State's assertion of a right to exclude from the jury in a capital case those who say that they could never vote to impose the death penalty or that they would refuse to consider its imposition in the case before them. 35 The Court reiterated this limitation on its holding in the oftenquoted footnote twenty-one:
[N]othing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by ajury from which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. 3 6 In limiting its holding as such, the Witherspoon Court technically decided the circumstances under which ajuror may not be excluded for cause and left open the question of the circumstances under which a juror may be properly excluded for cause. Nonetheless, subsequent Supreme Court and lower court decisions construed the language in Witherspoon's footnote twenty-one and similar language in footnote nine 38 as the decisive holding in the case and the standard by which juror exclusions were to be measured. 39 In Boulden, the Court emphasized the state's interest in obtaining jurors able to follow the law:
[I]t is entirely possible that a person who has "a fixed opinion against" or who does not "believe in" capital punishment might nevertheless be perfectly able as a juror to abide by existing law-to follow conscientiously the instructions of a trial judge and to consider fairly the imposition of the death sentence in a particular case. [Vol. 76 1034
ysis of the development of the standard, however, may have perpetuated the confusion present in the lower courts.
The Adams Court initially proposed that the Witherspoon decision, in footnote twenty-one, recognized that the state "might well have power to exclude jurors on grounds more narrowly drawn" than exclusion for "conscientious scruples." 4 8 The Court stated that the language in footnote twenty-one was "clearly designed to accommodate the State's legitimate interest in obtaining jurors who could follow their instructions and obey their oaths." '4 9 Thus, the Court announced the standard for cause excusal: "[a] juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." 50 Soon after the Adams decision, the Fifth Circuit, in Burns v. Estelle,-5 while citingAdams as controlling, nevertheless applied the two prongs of Witherspoon's footnote twenty-one as "talismans" in determining proper juror exclusion. 52 In light of such continued misplaced loyalty to the Witherspoon footnote, it seems that the Court's attempt in Adams to clarify the standard for juror exclusion was ineffective. Thus, only five years after deciding Adams, the Court in Wainwright v. Witt attempted to clarify that which the Supreme Court and the lower courts had muddied.
IV.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION By a 6-2-1 vote, 53 the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 54 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, "simplified" the standard for cause excusal in capital cases by denying any "ritualistic adherence" to the language in Witherspoon's footnote twenty-one 5 5 and embracing the The Witt majority proposed three reasons why the Adams standard was preferable to the language in Witherspoon's footnote twenty-one for determining proper juror exclusion. First, the language in footnote twenty-one is not applicable to the duties of present-day juries in capital sentencing cases. 57 In Witherspoon the jury had unlimited discretion in choosing a sentence: a juror who could consider imposing the death penalty was deemed able to follow the law and abide by his oath. 58 Only veniremen who would never vote to impose the death penalty or who could not impartially judge guilt could be excluded for cause. 59 Juries today, Justice Rehnquist reasoned, no longer have such broad discretion, and sentencing is often a result of ajury being asked specific factual questions in order to detemine if the death penalty is warranted in a particular case. 60 Regardless of whether a venireman might vote for the death penalty, the state should be able to challenge him if he indicates a refusal to follow the statutory scheme by truthfully answering the judge's sentencing questions. 6 1 Second, the Court reasoned that the language in the Witherspoon footnote was dictum and therefore not controlling. 62 The focus of Witherspoon was the circumstances under which veniremen could not 56 448 U.S. 38 (1980) . In Adams, the Court upheld the applicability of the Witherspoon principles to the bifurcated procedure employed by Texas in capital cases. The state was held to have violated the sixth and fourteenth amendments when it excluded veniremen because they were unable to take an oath that the mandatory sentence of death or life imprisonment would not "affect [their] 153 (1976) , sentencing juries were no longer given wide discretion. Instead, legislatures adopted capital sentencing schemes much like the one discussed in Adams. In a Texas capital case, affirmative answers to three specific questions put to the jurors would automatically result in the trial judge's imposition of the death sentence: (1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.871(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986 
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be excluded: thus, the Court did not decide when they could be excluded.
63
Third, Justice Rehnquist stated that the Adams standard was more in accord with traditional reasons for juror exclusion. 64 The state's power to exclude veniremen opposed to capital punishment originated from the idea that certain jurors, by not applying the law, could frustrate the state's legitimate interest in a sentencing scheme. 6 5 Witherspoon was simply a limitation on the state's power to exclude potential jurors-that power extended only to the interest in removing jurors who could not conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. 66 The Court concluded that the language of Adams was the correct standard: a prospective juror may be excluded for cause when his views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." 6 7 In so ruling, the Court dispensed with the language from Witherspoon referring to "automatic" decisionmaking as well as the requirement that ajuror's bias be proved with "unmistakable clarity." 68 More importantly, the Court cleared up the confusion present even after the Adams decision as to what was the correct standard by which juror exclusions were to be measured.
The second issue the Court resolved concerned the degree of deference a federal habeas corpus court is required to pay to a state trial court's determination ofjuror bias. The Court held that a trial judge's finding of juror bias was a "factual issue" requiring a "presumption of correctness" by the reviewing court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
In a similar case, Patton v. Yount, 7° the Court granted § 2254(d) deference to a trial judge's determination that a potential juror was not biased and was therefore properly seated. 7 1 In ruling that the holding in Patton applied equally to its present case, the Court stated that the trial judge's "predominant function in determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be easily discerned from an appellate record. These findings are the 'factual issues' that are subject to § 2254(d).
72
The Court concluded that the record provided "ample support" for the trial court's finding that venireman Colby's views would have prevented or substantially impaired the performance of her duties as ajuror. 7 3 The Court held that the respondent had not established by "convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous," and reversed the court of appeals' decision. S. 1013 (1984) , in regard to the trial judge's advantage of having seen and heard the juror in deciding bias. Judge Higgenbotham suggested deference to the trial judge in order to preserve the trial court's integrity as a court of law. Moreover, he noted that on habeas review, comity and federalism indicate the need to pay deference to independent mechanisms of state governments that have already reached one decision on the same facts. Id. 73 Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 856. Witt had attacked the record in two ways. First, he stated that from the record there was no way to determine whether the trial judge applied the correct standard. The Court, however, noted that where the record does not indicate the standard applied by the trial judge, he is presumed to have used the correct one. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983) . Moreover, the Court stated that there was every indication that the trial judge did indeed apply the correct standard. Although the judge did not participate in the voir dire questioning of Ms. Colby, he did participate in several subsequent questionings in which he asked questions "entirely consistent with the Adams standard." Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 856. The Court found no reason to believe that the trial judge's understanding of the standard changed between the time of the questioning of Colby and the questioning of subsequent veniremen. Id.
Second, Witt claimed that the voir dire questioning of Colby was too ambiguous to justify her exclusion. The court of appeals had agreed with Witt that the word "interfere" used in Colby's questioning "admits of a great variety of interpretations," and the voir dire did not indicate the extent of the "interference. Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring). 76 justice Stevens reasoned that given the "gruesome facts" of the case and Colby's "somewhat timorous responses," it was possible that her demeanor persuaded defense counsel that he would prefer a more vigorous, less reluctant juror than Colby. Id.
77 Id. justice Stevens based his opinion on a statement in a previous decision: "The failure to object generally indicates that the defense counsel felt that the trial error was not critical to his client's case; presumably, therefore, the error did not render the trial fundamentally unfair." Engle v. Isaacs, 456 U.S. 107, 136 n.1 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part Thus, Justice Brennan's chief concern was that the removal of Witherspoon's strict standard would result in a capital defendant, rather than the state, bearing the risk of a less than wholly neutral jury.
88
The dissent criticized the Court's perception that Adams was in-81 Id. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 82 "Death-qualification" is a term for the procedure of exclusion for cause, in capital cases, of jurors opposed to capital punishment. Id. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83 Justice Brennan proposed that while broad exclusions for random idiosyncratic traits result in no systematic bias, exclusion of those opposed to capital punishment keeps an identifiable class of people offjuries and is likely to systematically bias juries. These juries would be unlikely to represent a fair cross-section of the community. Id. at 861 (Brennan,J., dissenting). AsJustice Brennan explained, "the State's right to ensure exclusion of any juror who might fail to vote the death penalty when the State's capital punishment scheme permits such a verdict vanquishes the defendant's right to a jury that assuredly will not impose the death penalty when that penalty would be inappropriate." Id.
84 Id. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 87 Id. at 863 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 88 Id. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan conceded that in a capital trial, "perfect" neutrality cannot be achieved. Cf. Gross, supra note 31, at 26-28 (discussing the principle of uncertainty in criminal convictions).
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The Witherspoon Court proceeded to put a limit on the state's power to exclude jurors opposed to the death penalty, but the decision did not establish what in addition to "general objections" to the death penalty a prospective juror must express before he can be properly excluded. 11 Furthermore, as a protection to the state's interest, the "automatic" language in Witherspoon's footnote twentyone was unworkable. For example, the language would prohibit the state in a single-victim murder case from excluding for cause a prospective juror who would vote for the death penalty only in the case of a multiple murder. In the same case, the language would permit the state to exclude a prospective juror who would never vote for the death penalty, not even in the case of a multiple murder.
14
In the same Witherspoon footnote, however, the Court began to define more clearly the parameters of the state's right to exclude:
The most that can be demanded of a venireman... is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings." 15 The Adams Court articulated the parameters of the state's interest more simply and completely: the state has a "legitimate interest in obtaining jurors who [can] follow their instructions and obey their oaths." ' 1 ' 6 It is this state interest that was Justice Rehnquist's 112 Id. at 81. 1 1 The parameters of the state's power were very loosely defined. At one end, the state could not exclude jurors who simply had "general objections" to the death penalty; at the other, the state certainly had power to exclude at least those jurors who would automatically vote against the death penalty and those jurors who could not impartially judge the guilt of the defendant. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 513-14.
114 See Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously: The Search for Death Qyalified Jurors, 62 TEx. L. REv. 977, 984 (1984) . Witherspoon stated that veniremen can not be excluded for cause "simply because they indicate that there are some kinds of cases in which they would refuse to recommend capital punishment." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. One commentator suggested that Witherspoon's disapproval of the practice of excluding these "partially scrupled" jurors was well founded:
If a juror could be challenged for cause merely because he or she was against the death penalty in the circumstances at issue, a prosecutor could describe the particular facts of the case and demand to know how each venireman would vote at the penalty phase. . . . J]urors would be hand-picked for their willingness to execute the very defendant on trial. Moreover, if the criteria for juror selection were based on the particular circumstances of each case, then veniremen of increasingly mild scruples would be excluded as the heinousness of the crime decreased. 
